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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the welfare consequences of tax coordination
agreements which cover taxes on mobile capital and immobile labor,
respectively. In doing so, we take into account two important insti-
tutional details. First, we incorporate decentralized wage bargaining,
giving rise to involuntary unemployment. Second, we distinguish be-
tween complete tax coordination, which eectively covers both tax
instruments, and the more plausible case of partial tax coordination,
where one tax is marginally increased by all countries, while the other
tax rate can still be freely chosen by all countries. It is shown that
complete tax coordination remains to be welfare enhancing in the
presence of unemployment. In contrast, for partial tax coordination,
the welfare eects become ambiguous and are dierent to the case of
competitive labor markets.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal competition among countries has received increasing attention as jurisdictions
are connected by mobile capital. This has created an extensive literature on the
(un)desirability of international tax competition.1 As one basic result, it has been
pointed out that benevolent governments ignore the external eect their tax policy
has on the tax base of other countries via capital mobility (Wildasin 1989). Thus,
each policy instrument that is able to increase the attractiveness of domestic capital
employment, e.g., tax cuts, will be excessively used by all countries. Consequently, the
resulting equilibrium is inecient from a worldwide perspective as the public good pro-
vision is too low compared with the Samuelson rule (Samuelson 1954). Theoretically,
all countries would be better o by jointly increasing their level of taxation in order to
capture resources from capital owners since the latter cannot escape a worldwide tax
increase.
However, this standard tax competition result of undertaxation in the uncoordi-
nated Nash equilibrium has been challenged by incorporating various existing insti-
tutional characteristics pointing out that a joint tax increase may even be welfare
worsening. The level of taxation may even be to high in the uncoordinated equilibrium
if, e.g., non-benevolent governments are taken into account (Edwards and Keen 1996),
federal structures are considered which give rise to vertical scal externalities (Keen
and Kotsogiannis 2002, 2003) or public input goods are incorporated (Noiset 1995).
In this paper, we take a dierent view by analyzing whether a coordinated tax
increase may be welfare worsening even if the Nash equilibrium is characterized by
undertaxation. In doing so, we allow for two institutional details to be found in many
countries and analyze the way they interact if tax coordination is carried out. First, we
incorporate that labor markets are frequently characterized by wage bargaining, giving
rise to involuntary unemployment. Second, and in contrast to parts of the previous
literature, we take into account that an international coordination agreement is un-
likely to cover all policy instruments available to local governments. In fact, it is more
plausible that tax coordination is carried out with regard to one tax rate only, whereas
all governments are nevertheless free to choose their remaining tax instrument(s) af-
terwards. This approach can also be motivated by the existence of federal structures,
where one tax rate is (jointly) determined on a federal level while local states can
nevertheless choose another tax rate non-cooperatively.
So far, the literature that combines optimal taxation with unemployment mostly
concentrated on characterizing the structure of optimal taxation in a small open econ-
omy by incorporating wage bargaining (see, e.g., Richter and Schneider 2001 or Koskela
1This branch of literature was initiated by the seminal contributions of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986). For a survey, see Wilson (1999).
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and Schöb 2002) or eciency wages (Eggert and Goerke 2004). One exception is the
contribution by Fuest and Huber (1999b), where tax coordination is addressed explic-
itly. Their analysis is motivated by the presumption that, as tax competition puts a
downward pressure on tax rates, this may be desirable if involuntary unemployment
calls for a reduced level of taxation. Fuest and Huber put forward that in the presence
of involuntary unemployment, due to decentralized wage negotiations, tax competition
might be welfare enhancing. In particular, they argue that, for a labor demand elastic-
ity which is smaller than one, a coordinated increase in the capital tax and the wage
tax, respectively, reduces welfare. However, they discuss complete coordination only,
i.e. they consider a coordinated increase in one tax rate while keeping the respective
other tax rate constant.
On the other hand, the existing literature on partial policy coordination has not
yet taken into account imperfections on the labor market. Starting with the seminal
contribution by Copeland (1990) with respect to trade policy, several authors have
analyzed how countries might react to tax coordination if other policy instruments are
available which have not been subject to the coordination agreement. In response to
a joint tax increase, governments may adjust their provision of a public input good
(Fuest 1995), other tax rates or depreciation allowances (Fuest and Huber 1999a), tax
auditing activities (Cremer and Gahvari 2000) or a tax on a complementary factor
(Marchand et al. 2003). Intuitively, in all cases, countries try to compete back to their
initial Nash equilibrium. However, as shown by Wehke (2006) for the case of a fully
competitive labor market, the total welfare eect of partial tax coordination not only
depends on the extent to which all countries are able to compete back to the initial
Nash equilibrium. In addition, there may also be positive or negative welfare eects if
the distortion of the pre-existing tax system is altered.
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the literature of tax coordination by
taking into account labor market imperfections due to decentralized wage bargaining
as well as incomplete, i.e. partial, tax coordination agreements. In doing so, a similar
model setup is used as in Wehke (2006), where partial tax coordination is analyzed in
the presence of a fully competitive labor market. In detail, we allow for less than 100
percent prot taxation and, in contrast to many other models of wage negotiations (see,
e.g., Koskela and Schöb 2002), we assume the marginal disutility of supplying labor to
be non-constant (see, e.g., Keen and Marchand 1997 or Fuest and Huber 1999b). It is
rst shown that, in the presence of unemployment due to wage bargaining, the usage
of distortionary taxation deviates from the case of fully competitive labor markets.
However, unemployment does not justify dierent policy conclusions with respect to
complete tax coordination. The welfare eect is always positive and qualitatively sim-
ilar to the scenario of perfect labor markets. In contrast, for partial tax coordination,
the welfare eects are shown to become ambiguous and are dierent to the case of a
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exible labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model of a small unionized country is
set up in section 2. Section 3 presents each country’s optimal behavior in the uncoor-
dinated equilibrium. Complete tax coordination is considered in section 4, where one
tax rate is jointly increased and the respective other tax rate is kept constant. This
assumption is then relaxed in section 5, where we study the welfare consequences of
partial tax coordination. Finally, the last section summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of many small and symmetric countries. Each
country is inhabited by a large number of (homogenous) households, the number of
which we normalize to one. The (representative) household is endowed with a xed
amount of capital  and earns a net prot (1  ) from national rm ownership.
Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile and can be invested in the home country or
in the rest of the world to earn a constant net return  per unit. The prot income
accruing to private households is interpreted as the average net prot in the country.
In addition to capital income  and net prot income, households obtain income by
supplying labor, where we treat labor as perfectly immobile between countries and the
household’s total time endowment is normalized to one.2 As we will assume that the
net wage rate  is determined by decentralized wage bargaining, each household will be
underemployed in the sense that her choice of labor supply is rationed by labor demand.
Dening () to be the total disutility from supplying labor this implies that the net
wage rate  exceeds the marginal disutility 0()	 where we assume (0) = 0	 0() 
 0
as well as 00() 
 0 Alternatively, we can think of the households to be heterogeneous
and divided into  employed households and (1 ) unemployed households. In this
case, we may interpret () to be the aggregate disutility of supplying labor for the
whole country and  
 0() indicates involuntary unemployment of the (1  )
households.3
Total private utility  is assumed to be additive and consists of two parts. The rst
one is assumed to be linear in income and represents the net benet from supplying
labor plus capital and net prot income. The second part is utility derived from public
good consumption (), where 0 
 0 and 00  0. Hence,
 =  () +  + (1 ) + () (1)
In the following, we will assume that the disutility from labor supply is quadratic, i.e.
2The results would not change if we dene two separate groups of households, called capitalists
and workers.
3For a fully exible labor market, as considered in Wehke (2006), we would have  = 0()
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000() = 0	 for algebraic convenience.4
Each country’s government provides the public good  and raises revenue  with
a non-distortionary prot tax  levied on the rent of a third (non-specied) factor,5
a source-based capital tax  on net capital income from domestic capital input, and
a wage tax  on net labor income. We will assume that the prot tax is restricted
to a maximum level ¯	 where 0  ¯  1, and its revenue does not suce to ensure
a rst-best solution, i.e. to provide the public good at the rst-best level as well as
designing the tax system in order to fully correct for the labor market distortion. The
government budget constraint is given by
 =  +  +  = 	 (2)
where the marginal cost of the public good is normalized to one, implying a linear
marginal rate of transformation of one between private output and the public good.
In what follows, the government will be treated to be a Stackelberg leader towards
the private sector behavior, including the wage negotiations between rms and trade
unions.
Turning to the production side of the small jurisdiction, a homogenous output good
 is produced by a large number of identical rms, whose number we can normalize
to one. The (representative) rm utilizes capital  and labor  as the only variable
factor inputs to production. To keep the model manageable, we use a production
function with a constant elasticity of substitution between labor and capital as well as
decreasing returns to scale in both factors:
 =  (	) =
·³

1
 + 
1

´ 
1
¸11
	 (3)
where  
 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor due to the exis-
tence of a third (xed) factor such as land. The parameter   0 denotes the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor. Let the output good be the numeraire.6
Taking gross factor prices ˜ = (1+ ) and ˜ = (1+ ) as given, rms maximize
prots and thereby choose capital and labor inputs according to  (	) = ˜
4The literature on tax policy in the presence of wage bargaining often treats the marginal disutility
of labor as a constant term, i.e. 00() = 0 See, e.g., Boeters and Schneider (1999) or Koskela and
Schöb (2002). Thus, our assumption of a quadratic disutility is even more general than the previous
literature. Note that 00()  0 implies that the household’s preferred labor supply is increasing the
net wage rate.
5A tax on prots is indeed non-distortionary in this setting, as we assume rms to be immobile.
This is a standard assumption in the existing literature on capital mobility. For models with rm
mobility see, e.g., Richter and Wellisch (1996), Janeba (1998) or Aronsson and Sjögren (2004).
6Equation (3) can also be interpreted as being a linear-homogenous production function in capital
and labor, where the output good faces imperfect competition on the world product market due to
monopolistic competition (see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). In this case,   1 represents the constant
price elasticity of output demand.
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and  (	) = ˜ Together with the above production function, this allows
us to derive unconditional factor demands (˜	 ˜) and (˜	 ˜) with corresponding
elasticities that solely depend on the parameters of the productions function, i.e. 
and 	 as well as on the cost share of labor  (see Hamermesh 1993 or, e.g., Koskela
and Schöb 2002):
˜ = (1 )    0	 (4a)
	˜ =   (1 )  0	 (4b)
˜ = (1 )(  )	 (4c)
	˜ = (  )	 (4d)
where  is given by
 = (˜	 ˜) =
˜1

˜1
 + ˜1


As is common in the literature, we assume capital and labor to be price complements,
which is equivalent to suppose 	 
 0 as a property of the production function.
Consequently, we have     0 and the cross-price elasticities (4c) and (4d) are
negative in sign as the substitution eect does not outweigh the scale eect.
3 The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
3.1 Wage bargaining
The small country’s net of tax wage rate is supposed to be the outcome of a decen-
tralized union-rm bargain. In particular, we adopt the right-to-manage approach in
which the rm can choose employment conditional on the bargained wage rate. For
each country, we assume many small and symmetric trade unions that treat govern-
ment policy, i.e. 	  and , as well as the net interest rate  as given. For simplicity,
let the total number of trade unions be normalized to one.
Turning to the objective function of the representative trade union, we rst assume
that all households are trade union members and membership is not subject to changes.
The trade union is then interested in maximizing the utility of households as given by
equation (1). If the wage negotiation fails, union members receive the outside utility  
which is, for a small union, given by the member’s capital income, average prot income
as well as the utility derived from public good consumption, since these numbers are
not aected by the outcome of a decentralized wage negotiation:
  =  + (1 ) + ()
Consequently, the trade union’s rent from bargaining with the rm is given by
 =     =  ()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For the representative rm, we assume, as usual, that the outside option is given by zero
prots,  = 0.7 Hence, the rent form bargaining with the trade union is determined
by the net of tax prots, (1 ).
The Nash maximand of the wage bargaining problem can be written as
 =  [(1 )]1 	
where  denotes the relative bargaining power of the union. The net of tax wage
rate  is then implicitly dened by the rst-order condition  = 0 which balances
the percentage change in both parties’ rents, weighted by their respective bargaining
power. This can be rearranged to
b =  £ + (  0)˜¤+ (1 )(1 )μ  ()
¶
= 0 (5)
Note that in equation (5) the labor demand elasticity ˜	 the cost share of labor  as
well as the labor demand 	 in turn, depend on the gross factor prices ˜ = (1+) and
˜ = (1+ ) In what follows, we assume that the trade union’s bargaining power  is
suciently large such that 0 
 0 is fullled, indicating involuntary unemployment.
Since the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector, we
need to determine how the bargained wage is altered as a reaction to changes in the
policy instruments. Our specication of private utility does not allow for an inuence
of the public good on the wage rate. However, the net wage reactions in response to
changes in the tax rates are given by
 =


= 
bb 	  = 	 	
where b  0 must hold as a second-order condition of the Nash bargain. Thus, to
determine how the wage rate is aected by tax policy, the sign of b is important. In
detail, we have for the impact of the wage tax rate
b =   ˜˜00()1 +   (1 )(1 ) ˜1 + 
μ
0() ()

¶
	 (6)
where  = (  0)(  ) + (1  )(1  ) (  ())  0 and 0() 
 ()
due to our assumption that (0) = 0 and 00() 
 0 In equation (6), the rst term
indicates that an increase in the cost share of labor ceteris paribus leads to a reduction
in the bargained wage for two reasons. Firstly, the labor demand elasticity increases
in absolute terms thereby increasing the union’s marginal cost from a wage increase in
terms of laid-o workers. Secondly, the reduction in prots following a wage increase
7This requires rms to be immobile as supposed above. This assumption is frequently made in
the literature (see, e.g., Koskela and Schöb 2002 or Aronsson 2005). With rm mobility, the outside
option is given by foreign net of tax prots (see Aronsson and Sjögren 2004).
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becomes more pronounced which, in turn, increases the marginal damage to a rm.
According to the second term in (6), an increase in the wage tax lowers employment
which, in turn, reduces the marginal disutility of labor and renders an increase in
employment through a wage cut more interesting for the trade union. Finally, the last
term denotes that an increase in wage taxation will lower employment and thus, in
turn, the worker’s rent from being employed. Furthermore, we have
b =   ˜˜00()1 +   (1 )(1 ) ˜1 + 
μ
0() ()

¶
	 (7)
b =   ˜˜00()

 (1 )(1 )˜

μ
0() ()

¶
+(1 + ˜) + (1 )(1 ) (8)
The interpretation of equation (7) is analogous to the one with respect to the wage tax
rate. The change in the cost share of labor, however, diers among both tax rates and
depends on the elasticity of substitution:
 =
(1 )(1 )
1 + 
	 (9)
 = 
(1 )(1 )
1 + 
 (10)
For the change in the gross wage rate ˜ =  + (1 + ) we obtain
˜ =

£
(1 + ˜) + (1 )(1 )
¤
b 
 0	 (11)
i.e. increasing the wage tax will unambiguously increase the gross wage (and hence
reduce employment) since b  0 and the numerator of (11) is negative (where the
latter follows from the fact that the bargained wage rate must be positive; see Appendix
1).
3.2 Welfare maximization
Assuming a benevolent government, the Lagrangian, to be maximized with respect to
	 	  and 	 comprises the total private utility (1), the government budget constraint
(2) and a restriction on the maximum level of admissible prot taxation. Hence,
L =  () +  + (1 ) + () +  ( + +  ) +  (¯  ) 	
where we keep in mind that  = (	 	 ) and (·)	(·) as well as (·) depend on
both gross factor prices ˜ = (1+ ) and ˜ = (1+ )(	 	 ) The parameters  as
well as  denote Lagrangian multipliers on the government budget constraint and the
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maximum level of prot taxation, respectively. The rst-order conditions with respect
to the public good  and the prot tax rate  are as follows:
0() = 	 (12)
( 1) =  (13)
According to condition (12), public good provision should be expanded until the mar-
ginal utility of public good consumption equals marginal costs of its provision. In our
case, the latter is given by the marginal costs of public funds  since by assumption
the marginal rate of transformation between the private and the public good is equal
to one. This is referred to as the modied Samuelson rule (see Atkinson and Stern
1974).
Given the complementary slackness condition
 (¯  ) = 0	
we can distinguish two cases. Firstly, if the restriction on prot taxation is not binding,
¯ 
 , we have  = 0 and we can infer from (13) that  = 1 Tax revenue is then raised
non-distortionarily by the prot tax and public good provision is, according to (12),
already rst-best since 0() = 1. Secondly, if the restriction is binding, then  = ¯
and  
 0 so that  
 1 and we are in the more relevant scenario of a second-best
world. Public good provision is then ineciently low, 0() 
 1	 because taxation is
distortionary (at the margin). In what follows, we restrict our attention to the scenario
of second-best taxation, i.e. the case with  
 0 and  
 1
Turning to the rst-order conditions with respect to the tax rates, we have L =
0 which can be written as
0 =
  0
˜
˜˜ + ( 1) [(1 ¯)˜   ] + ˜
μ

1 + 
˜ +

1 + 
˜
¶
and L = 0 which yields
0 = (  0)
μ
˜˜(1 + )
˜
+ ˜
¶
+( 1)
·
(1 ¯)
μ
˜(1 + ) + ˜
1 

¶
 (1 + )
¸
+
·

1 + 
¡
˜˜(1 + ) + ˜˜
¢
+

1 + 
μ
˜˜(1 + ) + ˜
1 

	˜
¶¸

Each of the two rst-order conditions denes the marginal costs of public funds for
the respective tax instrument, dened as the utility loss in absolute terms per unit
of additional tax revenue. Any level of tax revenue is then raised eciently by the
available tax instruments if the marginal costs of public funds are equalized among the
tax rates.
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After some manipulation of the above rst-order conditions we can derive the fol-
lowing expression for the (eective) capital tax rate (see Appendix 2):

1 + 
=
 1

·
1 ¯

+
˜


˜


 	˜


˜
¸
	 (14)
where   0 is as dened above. Thus, there are only two mechanisms at work for
the optimal usage of the capital tax rate. The rst term on the right hand side of
(14) captures how capital taxation is used as a means to indirectly tax pure prots if
the maximum level of the admissible prot tax is less than 100 percent (see Huizinga
and Nielsen 1997). It is important to note that the parameter  
 1 determines the
extent to which pure prots are available since 1 =  represents the prot share
of domestic production. The two remaining terms on the right hand side of (14) then
indicate that capital taxation is used strategically depending on the interaction between
taxation and the wage bargaining result. On the one hand, if an increase in the capital
tax is associated with a higher net wage, this provides an incentive to ceteris paribus
use the capital tax as a subsidy in order to lower the wage rate. If, on the other hand,
a higher wage tax is associated with a higher net wage, the capital tax will be chosen
to be positive ceteris paribus in order to provide funds that allow for a reduction in
the wage tax. Due to our specication of the production function and private utility,
we are able to write the combined eect in a more convenient way so that the capital
tax rate becomes

1 + 
=
 1

"
1 ¯

 
1 
(1 )(1 )
˜
£
(1 + ˜) + (1 )(1 )
¤#  (15)
Consequently, this component of the capital tax is positive (negative) if  is greater
(less) than one. As explained above, the elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital crucially determines the change in the cost share of labor which, in turn, inu-
ences both the labor demand elasticity and the extent to which a wage increase aects
rm prots.
The eective wage tax rate is given by

1 + 
=
 1

·
1 ¯

+
	˜


˜
 ˜


˜


¸
   
0
˜
 (16)
The interpretation of the wage tax diers from the one of the capital tax as additional
mechanisms enter the optimal tax formula. The rst part of equation (16) shows a
similar pattern as the optimal capital tax rate. Wage taxation is also used to indirectly
capture pure prots and the wage tax is ceteris paribus higher if an increase in the wage
tax or reduction in the capital tax is able to reduce the bargained wage rate. The last
term entering the optimal wage tax equation (16), represents the ability of the wage
tax to directly reduce the distortion on the (monopolized) labor market by subsidizing
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labor. This eect goes back to Guesnerie and Laont (1978) who show that, in a
rst-best scenario, the price maker’s output should be subsidized in order to restore
Pareto-eciency. In the second-best setup discussed here, the subsidy, however, must
be weighted by 1 to take into account the welfare costs of distortionary taxation.
Combining the two terms which comprise the wage responses of tax policy, we can
express the optimal wage tax as follows:

1 + 
=
 1

1 ¯

+
 1

(1 )(1 )
˜
£
(1 + ˜) + (1 )(1 )
¤ (17)
+
 1

h
˜
00()+ (1 )(1 )
³
0() ()

´i
˜
£
(1 + ˜) + (1 )(1 )
¤    0
˜

The combined eect as given in equation (17), reveals that the impact running through
a change in the cost share of labor has the opposite sign to the capital tax rate since the
overall level of taxation is not used to strategically inuence the bargaining outcome.
Additionally, however, it turns out that the wage tax is used to tax rents accruing to
intramarginal labor suppliers. Even if we fully abstract from trade union wage setting
and the corresponding rent accruing to employed workers beyond the competitive wage
level  = 0()	 intramarginal labor suppliers obtain rents which give rise to taxation
since the marginal disutility of supplying labor is increasing, i.e. 0()	 00() 
 08 Sum-
ming up, the tax structure presented above resembles the results derived by Koskela
and Schöb (2002) and extends them to the case of 00() 
 0
4 Complete tax coordination
Turning to tax coordination, we rst analyze complete tax coordination in the sense
that coordination is eectively carried out with respect to both the capital tax as well as
the wage tax rate. In doing so, we consider a special case of complete tax coordination,
where one tax rate is marginally increased by all countries and the respective other
tax rate is agreed to remain constant throughout. This (rather restrictive) procedure
is employed by, e.g., Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and Wilson (1995) for the case of
perfect labor markets as well as Fuest and Huber (1999b) for imperfect labor markets.
4.1 Complete coordination of the capital tax
For a joint increase in the capital tax rate at a constant wage tax, we rst have to deter-
mine the repercussions on factor prices and allocation. After the marginal coordination
8In fact, it is easy to show that the level of distortionary taxation, i.e. 	
+  is solely used
to extract rents from the private sector (from private production if ¯  1 and from labor suppliers
as 00()  0) and to correct for the labor market imperfection (as   0  0).
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has been implemented, we must have that the capital employed in each country is still
equal to the country’s xed capital endowment due to our assumption of symmetric
jurisdictions. Hence,
 = (˜	 ˜)	 (18)
where the net interest rate  is now subject to changes if capital demand is altered by
a joint policy action. Furthermore, both bargaining parties still choose their optimal
wage rate in the new equilibrium, so that after coordination we still have
b = 0 (19)
Totally dierentiating the equations (18) and (19) with respect to 	  and  yields
the factor price reactions for a joint increase in the capital tax rate. We have


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= 
¡
	˜	˜ + (1 + )
¢
(1 + )
¡
	˜	˜ + 
¢
=  
1 + 
 0	
since (1 + ) =  and
9
˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=
˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= 0
As a consequence, the real allocation is unchanged and capital owners have to bear
the full burden of the joint increase in the capital tax as their net remuneration is
reduced.10
Given the above factor price changes in the presence of (complete) capital tax
coordination, the corresponding welfare eect is then easily determined. Using the
Lagrangian as the welfare measure for any of the countries involved, we have
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= 


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
+ 
Ã
 + 


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
!
= ( 1) 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0

 0 (20)
Consequently, a marginal increase in the capital tax, carried out by all countries,
is unambiguously welfare enhancing, given that the level of wage taxation remains
9Note that we have to assume for stability that
˜˜ + (1 + ) 6= 0
In fact, as is shown later, this term must be positive for the sake of stability of the Nash equilibrium.
10The allocation may change, however, if we drop the assumption of a linear private utility. See
Aronsson and Wehke (2006).
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constant. The intuition is analogous to the case of a fully exible labor market. As
capital is immobile from a worldwide perspective and the allocation of (immobile) labor
is unchanged in the course of the coordination, the burden of a joint capital tax increase
is fully born by worldwide capital owners and the additional tax revenue is captured
lump-sum. Thus, the welfare eect consists of the additional lump-sum tax revenue
weighted by the net welfare gain if one unit of tax revenue is spent on public good
consumption in a second-best environment. The qualitative welfare eect does not
depend on whether the labor market is governed by equalization of labor supply and
labor demand or is organized by Nash wage bargaining. The principle insights from
the tax competition literature with perfect labor markets thus also hold for countries
with distorted labor markets.
4.2 Complete coordination of the wage tax
In this subsection, we now consider the case in which all countries agree to marginally
increase their wage tax rate while keeping the capital tax xed at the level determined
in the Nash equilibrium. Theoretically, the possibility of capturing lump-sum resources
by means of wage tax coordination is addressed by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and
Fuest and Huber (1999b). Depending on the respective labor market organization,
however, they derive at dierent results.
In the present setting, complete wage tax coordination triggers factor price reactions
that again have to fulll equations (18) and (19). In detail, and dening    +
	˜	˜ 
 0	
11 the factor price changes can be written as


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=  
1 + 
˜

 0	 (21a)


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=

1 + 
 + (1 + )	˜	˜

	 (21b)
˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=


	˜
	˜
˜ 
 0	 (21c)
˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=  ˜
1 + 
˜

 0 (21d)
A marginal increase in the wage tax which is carried out by all countries has an am-
biguous eect on the bargained net of tax wage rate. The gross wage rate, however,
is unambiguously increased due to the higher tax wedge. Since labor demand falls in
the gross wage, the marginal product of capital is reduced in each country which, in
turn, calls for a worldwide reduction in the interest rate in order to fully employ capital
11Assuming   0 is equivalent to suppose 
	  0 This must hold as a stability condition of
the Nash equilibrium. See the Appendix for details.
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again. In contrast to marginal capital tax coordination, the joint change in the wage
tax will alter the worldwide allocation. In particular, each country’s labor employment
is, in general, reduced:


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= ˜
˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
+ ˜
˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
=
˜
(1 + )	˜
  0 (22)
Consequently, only for the special case of capital and labor being perfect complements
in production, i.e.  = 0	 a joint change in the wage tax rate does not aect employ-
ment. Intuitively, if capital and labor are employed in a constant ratio and the capital
employment must remain unchanged, the reduction in the interest rate will exactly
suce to compensate for the initial reduction in labor demand due to the increase in
the wage rate.
Given the factor price reactions in (21) and keeping the capital tax constant, the
welfare eect of (complete) wage tax coordination is then given by
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= ( 1) 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
 ( 1) 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
+ (  0 + ) 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
( 1)(1 ¯) 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
 (23)
As is shown in Appendix 3 all terms except of the rst one cancel out since the rst-
order conditions of the initial Nash equilibrium serve as a starting point of coordination.
Thus, the welfare eect reduces to
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= ( 1) 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0

 0 (24)
Similar to the case of the joint increase in the capital tax rate, the only eect that
is relevant with respect to welfare is the ability to reduce the net of tax interest rate.
Again, the intuition runs in an analogous way as in the case of a fully competitive
labor market. Although a marginal increase in the wage tax alters the allocation by
changing the wage rate and thus, in turn, employment and prots [see equation (23)],
the same is true for the uncoordinated case. As coordination starts from the unco-
ordinated Nash equilibrium, the corresponding welfare eects are already ‘optimized
out’. Consequently, the only eect relevant for welfare stems from the reduction in the
capital remuneration , a factor price change that was not part of a small country’s
uncoordinated decision problem.
Both, the result with respect to complete capital tax coordination as well as the
above result of a joint increase in the wage tax are in contrast to the one derived by Fuest
and Huber (1999b), who conclude that in the presence of involuntary unemployment
a coordinated increase in the capital tax or the labor tax will be welfare worsening
if the labor demand elasticity is smaller than one in absolute terms. However, by
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applying the envelope theorem, complete tax coordination must be welfare enhancing,
irrespective of the underlying labor market organization since it nevertheless captures
additional lump-sum revenues from the owners of the mobile factor.
Summing up, even if we allow for a labor market distortion that gives rise to in-
voluntary unemployment, (complete) tax coordination is nevertheless desirable. So
far, the only dierence is that countries use their tax policy to take the labor mar-
ket imperfection into account. However, the level of taxation is still too low in the
Nash equilibrium since each country ignores the externality of its tax policy on other
countries.
5 Partial tax coordination
As indicated earlier, the coordination agreement discussed in the previous section is
highly restrictive. In fact, it requires that both policy instruments are jointly chosen.
A more realistic approach would be to allow for a coordination of only one tax rate
because coordination agreements are likely to be incomplete in this sense or tax rates
are assigned to lower levels of government with the right to set them freely.
Analogous to the procedure in Wehke (2006), we therefore analyze how the results
of the preceding section change if one tax rate is jointly increased but the respective
other tax rate can still be freely chosen by all countries in order to maximize their own
welfare. To keep the calculations manageable and reduce the complexity of the analysis
in this section we restrict our attention to the extreme case of a monopoly trade union,
i.e. we use  = 1 in what follows.
5.1 Partial coordination of the capital tax
After all countries have agreed to marginally increase their capital tax rate, we now
assume that they can still make use of the wage tax in order to optimally respond to the
coordination agreement. Since we know that, in the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium,
the wage tax is determined by the rst-order condition L = 0 we have to nd
out to which extent all countries will adjust their wage tax if they face a coordinated
increase in the capital tax in order to ensure that this condition still holds. Each
country’s rst-order condition with respect to the wage tax rate yields its marginal
costs of public funds for the wage tax instrument:
 =
¡0
˜
˜ + (1 ¯)
¢
˜  ³

1+
˜ +

1+
˜ + (1 ¯)
´
˜  
 (25)
By totally dierentiating the right hand side of this expression with respect to both tax
rates and taking into account the corresponding factor price reactions for joint changes
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in tax rates we have:


¯¯¯¯
	=0
=  

¯¯
	=0

¯¯
	=0
 (26)
Equation (26) gives us the magnitude by which all countries have eventually adjusted
their wage tax in the new Nash equilibrium if the capital tax has been marginally
increased by all countries so that each country’s capital employment remains constant
in both cases. The sign of (26) can easily be determined, even without discussing its
explicit expression. First, note that stability of the Nash equilibrium requires that the
marginal cost of public funds of a tax rate must be increasing in this tax rate, if the
tax is changed jointly by all countries, i.e. 
¯¯
	=0

 012 Second, a worldwide
increase in the capital tax rate reduces the marginal tax revenue of the wage tax
instrument, thereby increasing the marginal costs of public funds of the wage tax, so
that 
¯¯
	=0

 0. This can easily be seen by inspecting (25) and recalling that
a joint increase in  does not aect the real allocation and thus, in turn, the values
of  	 ˜ as well as the factor demand elasticities. Since the denominator of (25)
is negatively aected by a coordinated increase in the capital tax rate, each country
perceives its wage tax to be more distortionary at the margin and is therefore willing
to reduce its level of wage taxation. Consequently, in the new Nash equilibrium, we
observe that all countries have lowered their wage tax as a response to the coordinated
increase in the capital tax so that we can sign equation (26) as |	=0  0.
The overall welfare eect of such partial capital tax coordination is then given by
the sum of two eects. First, welfare is increased since the capital tax rate is jointly
raised at a constant wage tax and additional lump-sum tax revenue is captured from
capital owners; see section 4.1. Second, welfare is reduced as all countries will react
by lowering their wage tax at a given capital tax and tax revenues are shifted back
to capital owners in a lump-sum manner; to see this, recall (the counterpart of) the
discussion in section 4.2 that a joint reduction in the wage tax, at a constant capital
tax, unambiguously reduces welfare even in the presence of unemployment. Thus, the
net welfare eect crucially depends on the magnitude of the worldwide reaction in the
wage tax:
L

¯¯¯¯
	=0
=
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
+


¯¯¯¯
	=0
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
	 (27)
where both welfare eects on the right hand side of (27) have already been determined
in sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Before we turn to an expression of the welfare eect in algebraic terms let us rst
set out an intuition about the mechanisms at work. To begin with, recall that the
12To see this, suppose that in all countries the wage tax is slightly higher (lower) than the one in
uncoordinated Nash equilibrium. As all countries have an incentive to lower (increase) their wage
tax, this joint reduction (increase) must lower (increase) the marginal costs of public funds of this tax
instrument in order to reach a stable Nash equilibrium.
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starting point is a joint increase in the capital tax which does not change the worldwide
allocation. However, this coordination agreement disturbs the initial (uncoordinated)
Nash equilibrium as it xes the capital tax rate on a higher level than preferred by each
country individually. As a consequence, all countries now engage in tax competition by
solely using the wage tax instrument. Each jurisdiction tries to attract mobile capital
from the rest of the world by lowering the wage tax but will fail in the new equilibrium
as all (symmetric) countries face the same incentive. This may be characterized as an
attempt to compete back to the initial Nash equilibrium which has been described in
section 3 to be the most preferred allocation from a single country’s point of view. The
better all countries are able to compete back, the smaller ceteris paribus the remaining
welfare gain of the marginal coordination of the capital tax. Intuitively, we should
expect that the joint wage tax adjustment is not perfectly able to undo the initial
coordination gain of the capital tax. To see this point, bear in mind that the initial
joint increase in the capital tax does not change the real allocation. The joint wage tax
adjustment, however, does alter the allocation on the labor market. Consequently, this
joint adjustment is, in general, ‘more costly’ than the initial capital tax coordination.
From a worldwide perspective, the wage tax is still distortionary, while the capital tax
then reduces to a lump-sum instrument.
In other words, when trying to compete back to the initial Nash equilibrium, each
country will realize that the employment level, in fact, deviates from the one that
has been most preferred before. This costly adjustment will induce countries not to
perfectly go back to their starting Nash equilibrium. To be even more detailed, recall
that a joint adjustment of the wage tax will alter each country’s total labor employment
according to equation (22). Thus, only for the extreme case of capital and labor being
perfect complements in production, i.e.  = 0	 total employment turns out to remain
constant when countries jointly change their level of wage taxation. In this case the
joint wage tax adjustment amounts to a lump-sum instrument that shifts resources
from the government back to the private sector. The wage tax adjustment is then
equally harmless to allocation as is the joint increase in the capital tax (see Appendix
4). As a consequence, the wage tax can be used to perfectly mimic the capital tax
so that the initial welfare gain of coordination can be wiped out completely, ceteris
paribus.
On the other hand, overall welfare might also be aected through a second channel
since the pre-existing distortion of the tax systemmay be altered. To see this intuitively,
recall that the starting point of coordination is the Nash equilibrium as has been
presented in section 3. In this uncoordinated equilibrium, each government chooses
its tax instruments by balancing the trade-o between the corresponding distortions
in the private sector with the gain of spending the public revenue. In doing so, each
benevolent government is willing to accept a certain distortion (at the margin) in
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return for the additional benet from public good consumption. If this pre-existing
tax distortion is changed after the coordination agreement has been implemented, we
have a second mechanism through which welfare might be aected. In the present
case, the initial joint increase in the capital tax does not aect employment as well as
gross factor prices. Consequently, we cannot expect to observe a change in the pre-
existing distortion due to the initial coordination agreement. Once the capital tax has
been xed on a higher level than preferred by each country individually, however, it
is the joint reduction in the wage tax that triggers a change in gross factor prices and
employment. In particular, this will have repercussions on the cost share of labor and
thus, in turn, on the distortion of the tax system.
Returning to the detailed welfare eect of equation (27) and inserting equations
(20), (24) and (26), we obtain after some cumbersome manipulations:13
L

¯¯¯¯
	=0
=  

¯¯¯¯
	=0
( 1)˜
˜˜(1 + ˜)

Since ˜  0 and (1+˜)  0,
14 the sign of the term  also determines the direction
of the total welfare eect. This term becomes
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	 (28c)
where ˜ 
 0	  
 0 and 	˜  0
The last line in (28) is non-negative in sign which ceteris paribus indicates that
a non-negative overall welfare eect remains even after the wage tax adjustment has
taken place. Only for the special case where |=0	=0 = 0 this expression reduces
to zero. Referring back to equation (22), this is the benchmark case of capital and
labor being perfect complements in production ( = 0). The joint adjustment of
the wage tax then does not alter each country’s labor employment since capital and
labor are employed in constant proportions and each country’s capital employment
will remain unchanged in a symmetric equilibrium. It is important to note that each
individual country perceives its wage tax to be an instrument that unambiguously
changes domestic employment. As all country follow the same incentive, however, the
resulting change in the interest rate will nally restore the initial employment level for
 = 0. Since all countries will nd their employment level unchanged, the wage tax
13The calculations are available upon request.
14Note that for  = 1 the condition b = 0 reads (1 + 	˜) = 0	˜ which implies that the
monopoly trade union will choose a wage rate where labor demand is elastic.
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can, in fact, be used as an instrument that is equally non-distortionary as has been the
case with the initial capital tax coordination. Consequently, for this benchmark case,
the wage tax can ceteris paribus be used as a perfect mimicry to the capital tax as a
means to compete for mobile capital. If the elasticity of substitution is strictly positive,
the joint wage tax adjustment is ‘costly’, since it does change the employment level
compared with each country’s welfare maximizing choice. For this reason, countries are
not willing to use the wage tax to perfectly undo the gain of the capital tax coordination
and a positive welfare eect remains. Thus, in general, the last term in (28) may be
interpreted as the extent to which all countries are able to compete back to the initial
Nash equilibrium.
As indicated earlier, welfare is also aected through another channel. Since the un-
coordinated Nash equilibrium is characterized by distortions due to wage negotiations,
we might see welfare eects if the pre-existing distortions are altered due to the joint
adjustment of the wage tax. In particular, the cost share of labor and the change of
the cost share of labor, respectively, determine this distortion. In this context, another
benchmark case is worth mentioning.
If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is unity, i.e. the production
technology is Cobb-Douglas, the cost share remains constant and the welfare eects in
the rst two lines of (28) vanish.
The second line in (28) turns out to be positive (negative) if   (
)1 From
section 3 it is already known that unilateral tax changes have repercussions on the
factor demand elasticities through the cost shares of capital and labor, respectively.
For joint tax changes, however, it is only the wage tax that is able to aect the factor’s
cost shares. More precisely, we obtain


¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= ˜(1 )(1 )
(1 + )	˜
	 (29)
i.e. a joint reduction in the wage tax increases (reduces) the cost share of labor if the
elasticity of substitution is greater (less) than one which, in turn, is associated with a
negative (positive) welfare impact. The inuence of the factor cost shares runs through
its impact on the factor demand elasticities [see the equations in (4)]. In particular, a
reduction in the cost share of labor renders the labor demand elasticity ˜ less elastic.
According to the rst line of equation (28), overall welfare is aected depending
on how the term 
1(  0)(  )(1  )(1  )
£
˜(1 + ˜)
¤
is altered due to
a joint change in the wage tax. In fact, this term corresponds to the second term
on the right hand side of the optimal capital tax formula for  = 1 [see equation
(15)]. It captures the extent to which each country uses the capital tax unilaterally to
inuence the outcome of the wage bargain. Consider the case in which the expression

1(  0)(  )(1  )(1  )
£
˜(1 + ˜)
¤
becomes larger when all countries
jointly reduce their wage tax rate, indicating that this is associated with a positive
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overall welfare eect. Referring back to equation (15), the right hand side of the
optimal capital tax formula then becomes smaller, whereas the corresponding capital
tax adjustment is excluded due to the international coordination agreement. In this
case, the capital tax rate is again higher than the level that is individually preferred
by each country which, in turn, contributes to higher welfare. Appendix 6 shows that


h

1
(0)(
)(1)(1
)
˜(1+˜)

i¯¯¯
	=0
is negative in sign if the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor falls short of unity implying a positive welfare eect. In
contrast, for  
 1 this term cannot be signed. Again, for the special case of a Cobb-
Douglas production function, this component of the welfare eect does not appear since
the tax system is not used to strategically inuence the bargaining outcome by altering
the labor demand elasticity.
Summing up, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is smaller
than or equal to one, then it is suciently ensured that partial capital tax coordination
is welfare enhancing in the presence of unemployment. In contrast, if the elasticity of
substitution is larger than one, there are two opposing eects. On the one hand, welfare
increases since the labor tax adjustment is costly and will not be used to completely
undo the welfare gain of the capital tax coordination. On the other hand, the pre-
existing distortion is augmented which is welfare worsening.
5.2 Partial coordination of the wage tax
Finally, let us turn to the question in which way a joint increase in the wage tax
aects welfare if the capital tax is still free to be adjusted by each country. In fact,
coordination agreements with respect to the wage tax rate are not a current issue in
the political debate of tax competition. As mentioned above, it has rather been the
theoretical literature on tax coordination that pointed out the link between the net
remuneration of capital and the factor costs of a complementary factor. However,
the analysis in this section may nevertheless be interesting since one often observes
countries with federal structures, where the wage tax is determined on a federal level,
which may be interpreted as tax setting on a coordinated level. On the other hand,
local taxes, e.g., a business tax, can then be freely chosen by lower-level governments.
In the case of a fully competitive labor market, the labor supply elasticity plays
a crucial role in determining the direction of the welfare eect when partial wage tax
coordination is carried out. To see this, note that a joint change in the capital tax
does not alter the allocation and all countries are therefore perfectly able to compete
back to the allocation of the initial Nash equilibrium if the labor supply elasticity
remains constant in the course of a joint wage tax increase. The total welfare eect
of partial wage tax coordination is zero in this case. However, since the distortion
of the tax system in the Nash equilibrium crucially depends on the absolute value of
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the labor supply elasticity, we observe welfare changes for a non-constant labor supply
elasticity. If a coordinated increase in the wage tax increases (decreases) the labor
supply elasticity, the pre-existing distortion of the tax system increases (decreases)
and overall welfare eect is then negative (positive).
Returning to the case of a non-competitive labor market, we analyze whether a
similar property carries over to a situation in which wages are determined by small
monopoly trade unions ( = 1). If all countries agree only to marginally increase their
wage tax and national autonomy is retained in the choice of the capital tax, we now
have to determine to which extent all countries nally adjust their capital tax such
that they still perceive this tax rate to be the best response from its small country
perspective. The optimal choice regarding the capital tax rate is given by the rst-
order condition L = 0	 which denes the marginal costs of public funds for this
tax instrument:
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Totally dierentiating this expression at a constant capital employment yields the
worldwide reaction of the capital tax rate following a coordinated marginal increase in
the wage tax:
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where, for stability of the Nash equilibrium, we need to have 
¯¯
	=0
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overall welfare eect of the partial coordination in the wage tax rate is then again given
by the sum of two eects, the initial welfare enhancing eect due to the joint increase
in the wage tax at a constant capital tax (see section 4.2) and the subsequent welfare
eect due to the worldwide adjustment of the capital tax at a given wage tax:
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=
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
+


¯¯¯¯
	=0
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
 (31)
Following the procedure of the previous subsection, we rst describe the mechanisms
that are able to aect welfare in this case before we turn to the detailed expression of
the overall welfare eect.
For an intuitive explanation of the total welfare eect it proves convenient to again
decompose the total eect into, rst, a coordinated increase in the wage tax at a con-
stant capital tax and, second, a joint change in the capital tax at a constant wage
taxation. From our previous discussion we know that, starting from the Nash equi-
librium, a joint increase in the wage tax changes the worldwide allocation, which has
15Note that {
¯¯

=0
} = {} as is shown in Appendix 5. Thus, as indicated earlier,
  0 must hold in the Nash equilibrium for the sake of stability.
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no rst-order eect on welfare. The welfare impact solely stems from the availability
to reduce the net interest rate which captures lump-sum tax revenue. On the other
hand, any joint reaction in the capital tax does not aect employment and gross factor
prices, but only the net remuneration of capital owners. Therefore, it should ceteris
paribus be possible for all countries to exactly compete back to their individually pre-
ferred allocation which is given by the initial uncoordinated Nash equilibrium. This
mechanism alone would enable all countries to exactly wash away the initial welfare
gain of the coordination in the wage tax.
Similar to the preceding subsection, however, there is a second channel through
which welfare is aected. The initial marginal increase in the wage tax rate, carried
out by all countries, will change the pre-existing distortion of the tax system. If this
initial coordination step augments (alleviates) the pre-existing distortion, the overall
welfare eect is negative (positive).
Inserting equations (20), (24) and (30) into the overall welfare eect (31), we derive
at
L

¯¯¯¯
	=0
= ( 1) 1 + 
1 + 
˜


Consequently, the sign of the total welfare eect is determined by the sign of the term
, which is equivalent to
1 + 
00()
0() 
(1 )(  )
"
 1



μ
(  0)(  )(1 )(1 )
(1 + ˜)
¶¯¯¯¯
	=0
 



μ
  0

¶¯¯¯¯
	=0
#
+
 1

μ
1 (  
0) (  )(1 )(1 )
(1 + ˜)(1 )(  )

¶


μ
00()
0()
¶¯¯¯¯
	=0
 (32)
Turning to the interpretation of the above welfare eect, it is instructive to recall the
expression for the optimal wage tax in the Nash equilibrium. For  = 1 and full prot
taxation we have
 =
 1

(  0)(  )(1 )(1 )
(1 + ˜)
+
 1

00()
0()
   
0

 (33)
Intuitively, the optimal usage of the wage tax depends on the availability of rents among
labor suppliers (see the second term) as well as the existence of unemployment (see the
rst and third term, respectively). Welfare eects arise if the right hand side of this
equation is changed by the marginal tax coordination, but the corresponding wage tax
adjustment is excluded due to the international coordination agreement.
To begin with, note rst that the change of the elasticity 00()0() is of cru-
cial importance. In fact, for the special case of a Cobb-Douglas production function
( = 1) it becomes the only component of the total welfare eect which can be seen
by referring back to equation (32). Since in the Cobb-Douglas case the costs shares of
labor and capital are constant in the uncoordinated setting the wage tax is not used
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in the Nash equilibrium to strategically inuence the net of tax wage rate by chang-
ing the labor demand elasticity. Moreover, for the special case of monopoly unions,
as considered in this section, we known from (5) that (  0) = 1˜ which
remains unchanged for  = 1 The direction of the overall welfare eect is then solely
determined by the sign of [00()0()]|	=0  To shed some light on the intu-
ition behind the result, bear in mind that a unilateral change in the wage tax always
alters domestic employment. Thus, each government will make use of the wage tax in
the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium depending on (the change of) the marginal disu-
tility of labor. In particular, the absolute value of the elasticity 00()0() crucially
determines the marginal welfare costs of wage taxation in the Nash equilibrium. To
see this, note that for a rather inelastic value of 00()0() the labor supply curve
is relatively at. In turn, this implies rather high welfare costs of wage taxation (at
the margin) since it becomes more dicult to capture intramarginal rents from labor
suppliers by marginally increasing the wage tax rate. In contrast, the corresponding
increase in the gross wage rate is rather high implying a large reduction in employment
and thus a higher welfare loss due to additional involuntary unemployment. The more
elastic the marginal disutility the smaller is the reduction in employment that is nec-
essary to capture rents from labor suppliers. Therefore, if a joint increase in the wage
tax increases this elasticity, i.e.  [00()0()] |	=0 
 0	 the pre-existing tax
system becomes less distortionary at the margin which gives rise to a positive welfare
eect. The opposite applies when a coordinated increase in the wage tax reduces the
elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor.
For the more general setting in which the elasticity of substitution diers from
unity, welfare is also aected through additional channels. On the one hand, the above
eect running the change in the disutility of labor is modied. As can be seen from
the lower line of (32), it is augmented (attenuated) if   (
)1
On the other hand, for  6= 1	 the upper line of equation (32) enters the total welfare
eect. A partial coordination agreement regarding the wage tax then contributes to
higher welfare if the initial joint increase in the wage tax reduces (  0)(  )(1
)(1)(1+˜) and increases (0), respectively. The former is suciently
ensured if   05; the latter holds for  
 1 (see Appendix 7). Both terms are
also components of the optimal wage tax expression (33) above. The interpretation
is analogous to that of the previous subsection. If the joint increase in the wage tax
lowers the right hand side of the optimal wage tax formula, this contributes to higher
welfare since the wage tax has been cooperatively chosen which, in turn, precludes a
corresponding tax adjustment. As argued before, the whole economy is characterized
by undertaxation so that all countries gain in terms of welfare if the wage tax is higher
than individually preferred by each country.
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6 Concluding remarks
Tax coordination is aimed at mitigating a worldwide tax distortion which emerges when
countries ignore the scal externalities of unilateral changes in their policy instruments.
The more policy instruments are included in a worldwide coordination agreement the
more eective it is. This paper analyzes this issue by employing taxes on immobile
labor and mobile capital, taking into account that wage bargaining gives rise to invol-
untary unemployment. In particular, two (extreme) scenarios of tax coordination are
discussed.
First, concerning complete tax coordination, imperfections on the labor market are
not able to justify dierent policy conclusions with regard to coordination compared
with the case of fully competitive labor markets as has been suggested by Fuest and
Huber (1999b). We nd that, starting from the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium, a joint
increase in the capital tax is always welfare enhancing, if the wage tax is held constant.
The same holds true for a coordinated increase in the wage tax at a constant capital
tax, provided that capital and labor are complements in production. In both cases,
marginal tax coordination is able to reduce the net remuneration of capital ownership,
thereby shifting resources to the public sector in a lump-sum manner, a policy option
not available to individual countries. Whether or not the underlying tax structure is
designed for exible labor markets or imperfect labor markets is not important for the
welfare impact of coordination. Thus, even for Nash equilibria which are qualitatively
dierent the desirability of (complete) tax coordination is the same.
With regard to partial tax coordination, however, the organization of the labor
market does matter. In the presence of unemployment due to decentralized wage
bargaining, the welfare results are more complex and become ambiguous. In general,
there are two mechanisms at work. On the one hand, the tax instrument that is still
free to be adjusted by each country after the tax coordination is used to mimic the
tax rate that has been coordinated so that countries try to compete back to the initial
Nash equilibrium. Taxes on labor and capital are dierent in that respect. While an
uncoordinated but symmetric adjustment of the capital tax is non-distortionary and
can be used to perfectly undo any gains of coordination, such an adjustment in the
wage tax is, in general, distortionary from a global perspective. On the other hand,
the pre-existing distortion of the tax system may be altered due to the coordination or
the subsequent joint tax adjustment. Since the optimal usage of the available tax rates
in the presence of unemployment diers from the case of competitive labor markets,
we have a mechanism that introduces dierent welfare eects when comparing exible
and rigid labor markets.
Even under the rather restrictive assumptions made, the present paper illustrates
that if tax coordination fails to include all policy instruments the overall welfare eects
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become quite complex and are ambiguous a priori. An important benchmark case,
that reduces this ambiguity, is the one of a Cobb-Douglas production technology. For
this situation, a marginal coordination of the capital tax is welfare enhancing even
if all countries can freely decide upon their wage tax rate. In contrast, a marginal
coordination of the wage tax is then associated with a welfare gain if the elasticity
of the marginal disutility of labor is augmented, provided that each country retains
national autonomy in the choice of the capital tax.
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Appendix
1. Nash wage bargaining and the sign of equation (11)
Solving the rst-order condition of the Nash maximand, i.e.

¡
 + (  0)˜
¢
+ (1 )(1 )
μ
  ()

¶
= 0	
for the net wage rate yields
 =
0()˜ + (1 )(1 )()

¡
1 + ˜
¢
+ (1 )(1 ) 
As the numerator is strictly negative due to ˜  0 and  
 1	 we must have

¡
1 + ˜
¢
+ (1 )(1 )  0
to ensure a positive net wage rate.
2. Derivation of the optimal tax rates in the Nash equilibrium
First, multiplying rst-order condition L = 0 with (1 + )˜ and L = 0
with ˜ and combining both expressions yields
0 =
 1

μ
(1 ¯)1 

 
˜
1 + 
1 + 
¶
+
μ
  0
˜
+

1 + 
¶
˜ +
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1 + 
1 

	˜
Second, rearranging L = 0 gives
0 =
 1

μ
(1 ¯) + 
˜
¶
=
μ

1 + 
+
  0
˜
¶
˜ +

1 + 
˜
Combing these two equations by adding them up yields
 1

1 ¯

  1


˜
μ

1 + 
1 + 
+ 
¶
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1 + 
+ (1 ) 
1 + 

Inserting this expression into the rst-order conditions L = 0 and L = 0	
respectively, gives us the optimal tax rates:

1 + 
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3. The welfare eect of a joint increase in the wage tax ( = 0)
Using equation (22) for the employment eect and applying Hotelling’s lemma, i.e.
˜ =  and ˜ = 	 the eect on total welfare is given by
L

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
= ( 1) 
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¯¯¯¯=0
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 ( 1) 
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Rearranging the last three terms by inserting the joint factor price changes from (21)
yields
1

·
(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After plugging in the optimal wage tax as given by equation (16), we have
( 1)

·μ
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	˜
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¶¸
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4. The distortion of a joint change in the wage tax rate
To determine the extent to which a coordinated increase in the wage tax is distortionary,
we have to compare the corresponding eects on private utility and total tax revenue.
Using Hotelling’s lemma, the additional tax revenue amounts to

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 (A.1)
Private utility will be negatively aected by a joint increase in the wage tax. Thus,
the change in private utility in absolute terms is given by
 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¯¯¯¯=0
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	=0
  

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
 

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
(1 )
Ã
 ˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
 ˜

¯¯¯¯=0
	=0
!
 (A.2)
Since ˜ = (1+) and ˜ = (1+)	 we have ˜|=0	=0 = (1+) |=0	=0+
and ˜|=0	=0 = (1+) |=0	=0 which, in turn, simplies the last term in (A.2)
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such that the change in private utility becomes
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Comparing expressions (A.1) and (A.3) reveals that they coincide only if |=0	=0 =
0 Note that this holds irrespective of whether or not we start from the uncoordinated
equilibrium.
5. Joint factor price changes and the sign of 
Note rst that the marginal costs of public funds for the capital tax are given by
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as given in the text (see section 5.2). For a joint increase in the capital tax, we have
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where  is the denominator of  and the term in bracket is equivalent to  Thus,
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(
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As already mentioned in the text, to reach a stable Nash equilibrium requires that the
welfare cost of a tax instrument increase if this tax is increased by all countries jointly.
Hence,  
 0 ensures this stability.
6. Partial coordination of the capital tax
For a constant capital employment, the repercussion of a change in the wage tax on
the right hand side of the optimal capital tax equation is given by
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where ()(1+˜)1 = [  1] (1+˜). Thus the whole expression becomes
negative for   1 and ambiguous for  
 1
7. Partial coordination of the wage tax
First, we have
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which is unambiguously smaller than zero for   12 For   12 it cannot be signed.
Secondly, we have
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